This is a collection of UM-Flint Philosophy Department faculty publications,
including books, chapters in edited anthologies, and journal articles.
| Dr. Jami L Anderson | Dr. Simon Cushing | Dr. Aderemi Artis | Dr. Bénédicte Veillet | |||
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Books Book Chapters Journal Articles |
Books Book Chapters Journal Articles |
Journal Articles |
Book Chapters Journal Articles |
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| Dr. Charles E. M. Dunlop, Professor Emeritus | Dr. Nathan Oaklander, Professor Emeritus | |||||
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Books Book Chapters Journal Articles |
Books Book Chapters Journal Articles |
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The Philosophy of Autism Edited by Dr. Jami L. Anderson and Dr. Simon CushingChapter details forthcoming. |
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Race, Gender, and Sexuality: Philosophical Issues of Identity and Justice This anthology of contemporary articles (and court cases provides a philosophical analysis of race, sex and gender concepts and issues. Divided into three relatively independent yet thematically linked sections, the anthology first addresses identity issues, then injustices and inequalities, and then specific social and legal issues relevant to race, sex and gender. By exposing readers to both theoretical foundations, opposing views, and "real life" applications, the anthology prepares them to make critically reasoned decisions concerning today's race, gender and sex social issues. Sex and Gender Identity. Sexuality and Sexual Orientation. Race and Ethnicity. Racism. Sexism. Heterosexism and Homophobia. Equality and Preferential Treatment. Discriminatory Harassment. Identity Speech and Political Speech. Sexual Speech. Sexual Assault. For anyone interested in the philosophical underpinnings of today's Race, Sex, and Gender issues. |
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Sex, Drugs and Rock & Roll: Psychological, Legal and Cultural Examination of Sex and Sexuality Edited by Helen Gavin and Jacquelyn BentChapter Title: "Comprehending the Distinctively Sexual Nature of the Conduct" ABSTRACT Since the 1970s, sexual assault laws have evolved to include prohibitions of sexual acts with mentally retarded individuals. The argument justifying this prohibition is typically as follows:
In this paper, I claim that shifting the analysis to one based on harms (away from legal standards of consent) better captures our intuitions about sex acts involving mentally retarded individuals. (Indeed, a review of case law reveals a focus within these cases on the harms experienced by the mentally retarded individuals involved.) I close the paper by identifying the difficulties that plague any legislation concerning individuals with mental impairments. |
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Ladies and Gents: Public Toilets and Gender Edited by Olga Gershenson & Barbara PennerChapter Title: "Bodily Privacy, Toilets, and Sex Discrimination: The Problem of 'Manhood' in a Women's Prison" ABSTRACT Unjustifiable assumptions about sex and gender roles, the untamable potency of maleness, and gynophobic notions about women's bodies inform and influence a broad range of policy-making institutions in this society. In December 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit continued this ignoble cultural pastime when they decided Everson v. Michigan Department of Corrections. In this decision, the Everson Court accepted the Michigan Department of Correction's claim that “the very manhood” of male prison guards both threatens the safety of female inmates and violates the women's “special sense of privacy in their genitals” and declared that sex-specific employment policies for prison guards is not impermissibly discriminatory. I believe that the Court's decision relies on unacceptable (and offensive) stereotypes about sex, gender and sexuality and it significantly undermines Title VII's power to end discriminatory employment practices. |
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G.W.F. Hegel Edited by Dudley KnowlesChapter Title: "Annulment retributivism: a Hegelian theory of punishment" |
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Analyzing Moral Issues Edited by Judith A. BossChapter Title: "Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism" |
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Technology, Morality and Social Policy Edited by Yeager HudsonChapter Title: "Understanding Punishment as Annulment" |
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APA Newsletters: NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY "Hegel Knits"ABSTRACT I have come to think of the activity of knitting, if properly undertaken, as neither mindless nor archaic but can be, to return to the Hegelian discussion introduced above, formative of our personality and the knitwear produced a material embodiment of our freedom. Before explaining this claim, I wish to first discuss three common justifications for knitting that I find in knitting books and magazines. The first, which I refer to as “knitting as useful,” justifies the activity of knitting in terms of it being the most cost-effective way to have access to well-designed necessary knitted clothing. The second justification for knitting, which I refer to as “knitting as therapy,” justifies knitting for its therapeutic value. Knitting, advocates promise, will soothe and enrich your soul. The final justification, which I refer to as “knitting as funky,” justifies knitting in terms of its enabling the knitter entry into the latest lifestyle craze. On this account, to fail to knit is to miss out on what everyone hip is doing and, at some level, to fail to be a part of the “latest thing.” I think all three justifications are, for different reasons, wrong-headed and fail to capture what I think are very important reasons to knit. After briefly examining these accounts, I will lay out my Hegelian analysis of knitting. |
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Social Philosophy Today "The White Closet"ABSTRACT First, whiteness colonizes, appropriates and controls the Other. Whiteness is, then, racist. Second, whiteness is constructed unwittingly. Whites are, it is claimed, unaware of the harms they inflict on a genocidal scale because whiteness, like the air we breathe, is “invisible” to those who construct it and are constructed by it. Whiteness is, then, innocent. I think defining whiteness as innocent racism is troubling for two reasons. First, it leaves whites unaccountable for the acts of racism they perpetuate. Second, I think that the claim that whiteness is invisible “like the air we breathe,” while a powerful and fascinating metaphor, is mistaken. I will argue that whiteness is closeted; and while the closet makes the acknowledgement of whiteness difficult, it does not make it impossible. Thus, though closeted, whites are morally accountable for the acts of racism they commit. |
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Legal Theory "ANNULMENT RETRIBUTIVISM: A Hegelian Theory of Punishment"ABSTRACT Despite the bad press that retributivism often receives, the basic assumptions on which this theory of punishment rests are generally regarded as being attractive and compelling. First of these is the assumption that persons are morally responsible agents and that social practices, such as criminal punishment, must acknowledge that fact. Additionally, retributivism is committed to the claim that punishment must be proportionate to the crime, and not determined by such utilitarian concerns as the welfare of society, or the hope of deterring other criminals. Because the most commonly discussed version of retributivism is developed from Kant's moral and legal theory, I will refer to it as Kantian Retributivism. Despite its appeal, Kantian Retributivism cannot provide a satisfactory response to a kind of case that is receiving increasingly serious consideration in philosophical literature. The case is this: Many crimes are committed by individuals profoundly disadvantaged by unjust social institutions, such as racism, classism, and/or sexism. If such individuals commit crimes, the retributivist is placed in a very difficult position: Either she must claim that the individual has willfully committed a crime and for that reason deserves punishment, seeming to ignore entirely the social background of the individual, or she can claim that the individual—in virtue of being disadvantaged by social injustices(s)—does not deserve punishment because such punishment would be unfair. I have argued elsewhere that neither strategy is tenable. |
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Criminal Justice Ethics "Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism"ABSTRACT Retributivism is regarded by many as an attractive theory of punishment. Its primary assumption is that persons are morally responsible agents, and it demands that the social practices of punishment acknowledge that agency. But others have criticized retributivism as being barbaric, claiming that the theory is nothing more than a rationalization for revenge that fails to offer a compelling non-consequentialist justification for the infliction of harm. Much of the contemporary philosophical literature on retributivism has attempted to meet this criticism. One common move has been to recast retributivism within the social contractarian tradition. The argument is that the justification for retributive punishment flows naturally from social contractarian political theories. Thus, not only is it reasonable to claim that wrongdoers merit punishment independent of any consequentialist concerns, but that fairness requires retributive punishment. While allying retributivism with social contractarianism provides retributivism with a nonconsequentialist justification for punishment (one fuller and less problematic than the conception of "desert" that worries the critics of retributivism), I will argue that far from strengthening the justification of retributivism, social contractarianism weakens it. For this version of the theory invites the Marxist charge that our society is ordered by profoundly unfair political and social institutions, and that to justify punishing the criminals disadvantaged by such institutions with the claim that fairness requires their punishment approaches a cruel joke. Some have defended the contractarian-based theory of retributivism against the Marxist criticism by claiming that it does not require the punishment of such individuals precisely because social relations are unfair. I will conclude in this paper that although such a move is appealing, it is untenable. And if such a move is not open to the retributivist, she is now in the uncomfortable position of either turning a blind eye to the injustices by which many criminals are victimized or abandoning her retributivist intuitions (the very intuitions that drove her to social contractarianism to bolster her theory of retributivism in the first place). I will conclude that attempts to bolster retributivism by appeal to social contractarianism should be abandoned and retributivists ought instead to seek to develop their theory of punishment within an alternative type of political theory. |
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The Philosophy of Autism Edited by Dr. Jami L. Anderson and Dr. Simon CushingChapter details forthcoming. |
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Challenging Evil: Time, Society and Changing Concepts of the Meaning of Evil Edited by Johannes Schlegel & Brita Hansen"Evil, Freedom and the Heaven Dilemma" ABSTRACT The Free Will Defence, most vigorously pressed by Alvin Plantinga, is considered to be the most powerful response to the claim that the problem of evil ('how can an omnipotent, all-good God allow evil?') can be used as an argument against theism. The defence rests on two core claims, both necessary: FWD (1) You cannot have a state of existence containing beings with free will without it being accompanied by evil; FWD (2) A state of existence without both free will and the resulting evil is better than one without either (no matter how pleasant that world might be). Let us assume that the following things are true of Heaven: H1. Heaven is the best possible state of existence; H2 There is no evil in Heaven. With that in mind we can ask: Do we have free will in Heaven? The response must be either: a) Yes, in which case FWD (1) is false, or b) No, in which case FWD (2) is false. Hence the Heaven Dilemma: either way, one of the two essential assumptions of the Free Will Defense is false. I consider various possible theistic responses to this dilemma, several involving different taxonomies of evil. |
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Layers of Dying and Death Edited by Kate Woodthorpe"Don't Fear the Reaper: An Epicurean Answer To Puzzles about Death and Injustice" ABSTRACT I begin by sketching the Epicurean position on death - that it cannot be bad for the one who dies because she no longer exists - which has struck many people as specious. However, alternative views must specify who is wronged by death (the dead person?), what is the harm (suffering?), and when does the harm take place (before death, when you're not dead yet, or after death, when you're not around any more?). In the second section I outline the most sophisticated anti-Epicurean view, the deprivation account, according to which someone who dies is harmed to the extent that the death has deprived her of goods she would otherwise have had. In the third section I argue that deprivation accounts that use the philosophical tool of possible worlds have the counterintuitive implication that we are harmed in the actual world because counterfactual versions of us lead fantastic lives in other possible worlds. In the final section I outline a neo-Epicurean position that explains how one can be wronged by being killed without being harmed by death and how it is possible to defend intuitions about injustice without problematic appeal to possible worlds. |
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Technology, Morality and Social Policy Edited by Yeager HudsonChapter Title: "Agreement in Social Contract Theories: Locke vs. Rawls" |
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Journal of Value Inquiry "Justification, Legitimacy, and Social Embeddedness: Locke and Rawls on Society and the State"ABSTRACT “The fundamental question of political philosophy,” wrote Robert Nozick memorably, “is whether there should be any state at all.” A. John Simmons concurs. For him, the task of “justifying the state” must take the following form: we should assume anarchism as a theoretical baseline and demonstrate that there can be at least one state type that is neither immoral nor inadvisable. Justification is a separate task, however, from showing that any particular state is legitimate for a particular individual, which means that the former has the right to rule over the latter. In “Justification and Legitimacy” Simmons contends that Locke's political philosophy provides the model for the conceptual distinction between state justification and state legitimacy which has been lost in what he terms the Kantian turn of contemporary political philosophy. Modern followers of Kant, John Rawls chief among them, work with a conception of justification that is “doubly relativized” in comparison with the Lockean notion. Instead of providing anarchists with objective reasons for having states, Kantian justification is offered to those who already agree that some kind of state must be justified, and it is justification relative to the moral positions of those who will make up the society in question. This double relativism is regrettable because it obscures the difference between two central ways in which we should (and do) morally evaluate states, and it generates confusions about other serious practical issues, such as those surrounding our moral obligations to comply with law. In particular, Simmons charges that a follower of Kant “in effect tries to make it seem” that state justification is sufficient for state legitimacy. For followers of Kant like Rawls, justification is achieved by a hypothetical social contract, and, according to Simmons, Rawls's view entails that citizens are obligated to obey the laws of their just states because of a hypothetical agreement made by their hypothetical representatives. However, it is a widely held principle that an individual cannot be obligated by the consent of others unless prior consent on her part has granted those others the right to consent for her. But such prior consent would amount to an actual rather than a hypothetical contract. In a recent paper Cynthia Stark calls just this criticism of hypothetical consent theories the “standard indictment” and takes pains to show that it is misguided. She focuses on Rawls and Nagel and contends that for them justification is merely necessary for legitimacy, which would place them in agreement with Simmons, who writes that “the justification of a type of state is necessary for consent to a token of that type to be binding,” where consent, on his view, establishes legitimacy. |
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Journal of Social Philosophy "Against “Humanism”: Speciesism, Personhood, and Preference"ABSTRACT In this paper, I shall argue that humanism is an indefensible moral position, and that speciesism, once properly analyzed, is indeed directly analogous to racism and sexism. The main reason why speciesism is not held to be as serious a wrong as racism or sexism, is, I think, because we now automatically assume that women and nonwhites are moral persons, on an equal footing with white males (in the sense of being entitled to the same basic set of rights and liberties) but assume that nonhumans are not persons in this sense. That is, the central disagreement between humanists and their critics is over the membership criteria for personhood. My paper reflects this concern, as I focus on issues of criteria of personhood to the exclusion of other issues that concern chauvinisms. |
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Social Philosophy Today "Liberal Nationalism, Culture, and Justice"ABSTRACT Over the past ten years or so, the position of Liberal Nationalism has progressed from being an apparent oxymoron to a widely accepted view. In this paper I sketch the most prominent liberal defenses of nationalism, focusing first on the difficulties of specifying criteria of nationhood, then criticizing what I take to be the most promising, culture-based defense, forwarded by Will Kymlicka. I argue that such an approach embroils one in a pernicious conservatism completely at odds with the global justice concerns that I take to be central to liberalism with its core values of equality and liberty. |
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APA Newsletters: Newsletter on Philosophy and Law "Rawls and "Duty-Based" Accounts of Political Obligation"ABSTRACT Since Hobbes at least, all the great political philosophers of the liberal tradition have assumed that humans are in some sense naturally politically free and equal. That being the case, how can one legitimately leave that state and acquire political obligations to institutions that assign inequalities in political authority among individuals? Two contrasting answers to this question have been offered by the most influential members of the contract tradition, John Locke (in his Second Treatise on Government) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (see especially The Social Contract). Locke was a consent theorist, claiming that "no one can be . . . subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent" (Second Treatise, §95). Rousseau's theory is what one could call a self-legislation account. Notoriously, he argues that with the social contract one remains "as free as before" by becoming part of the general will, obeying the dictates of which makes one both civilly and morally free. Neither account has many adherents today; no interpreter has managed to remove the sinister connotations from Rousseau's claim that one can legitimately be "forced to be free," while Locke's consent theory either implies that one can consent without realizing it, or that only a small minority of citizens of a society are actually obligated to its government. Can one be true to the social contract tradition and offer a plausible account of political obligation? For the answer, we must turn to the work of John Rawls, who almost single-handedly resurrected the theory of the social contract in the 20th century. |
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Southwest Philosophy Review "Representation and Obligation in Rawls' Social Contract Theory"ABSTRACT There are two main roles for an account of justification in political philosophy. The first is that of political obligation, of settling the question of which society I am uniquely obligated to.1 The second role for an account of justification is that of establishing whether or not a social system is a just, or more vaguely, a legitimate one. That the two justificatory roles are distinct can be seen by noting that even in a world of many perfectly just societies with perfectly legitimate laws, one would still presumably only be a citizen of one of those countries. These roles are not clearly distinguished in the classic social contract theories of Locke and Rousseau in particular, but there the contract fills both roles, as I will show. Rawls's hypothetical social contract seems designed only to address the second role, but Rawls does in fact explicitly tackle the issue of political obligation in A Theory of Justice, 2 where he tries to remedy the flaws of the classic social contract obligation account with a duty-based account. In this paper I shall assess the criticisms of his account offered by A. John Simmons in his book Moral Principles and Political Obligations3 and a possible response to the criticisms that Samuel Freeman has implicitly offered in his work on Rawlsian social contracts. I conclude, however, that this response rests on an equivocation in Theory and thus fails. |
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Inter-Disciplinary.Net: Global Conference (2007) "Reaching For My Gun: Why we shouldn't hear the word “culture” in normative political theory"ABSTRACT Culture is a notoriously elusive concept. This fact has done nothing to hinder its popularity in contemporary analytic political philosophy among writers like John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, Michael Walzer, David Miller, Iris Marion Young, Joseph Raz, Avishai Margalit and Bikhu Parekh, among many others. However, this should stop, both for the metaphysical reason that the concept of culture, like that of race, is itself either incoherent or lacking a referent in reality, and for several normative reasons. I focus on the following interconnected points:
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An Anthology of Philosophical Studies "Descartes, Luther, and the Fifth Lateran Council"ABSTRACT In the letter of dedication to his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes presents his work as the fulfillment of the bull produced by the eighth session of the Fifth Lateran Council under pope Leo X. This has not gone unnoticed by scholars, and a number of recent works on Descartes have given attention to the question of how Descartes' thoughts in the Meditations relate to the Council's bull. More specifically, these scholars have investigated how Descartes' treatment of the immortality of the soul relates to the competing doctrines on the soul attacked by the Lateran Council, namely, Alexandrism and Averroism. Recent commentators have largely agreed both that Descartes failed in his attempts to defeat the competing doctrines on the soul or provide a coherent account of the character and grounds of the soul's immortality, and that the immortality of the soul is the chief topic of interest in the Council's bull as it relates to the Meditations. If one accepts these conclusions, then one must also accept that Descartes failed in his attempts to carry out the bull of the Fifth Lateran Council, and, moreover, that the church might well have been correct in placing his work on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, at least according to its own standard of judgment. However, I argue that the main purpose of the eight session was to assert the doctrine of “single truth” against that of “double truth,” and so deny that philosophy has access to truths distinct from or potentially at odds with the truths of faith. I further suggest that the misunderstanding of the meaning of the bull can at least in part be traced to the writings of Martin Luther, and, finally, conclude that Descartes was in fact successful in carrying out the edicts of the Council's bull. |
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Cognitive Phenomenology Edited by Tim Bayne and Michelle MontagueChapter Title: "The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology" Co-Authored with Peter Carruthers |
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European Journal of Philosophy "Belief, Re-identification and Fineness of Grain"ABSTRACT The so-called 're-identification condition' (Kelly ) has played an important role in the most prominent argument for nonconceptualism, the argument from fineness of grain. A number of authors have recently argued that the condition should be modified or discarded altogether, with devastating implications for the nonconceptualist (see, e.g., Brewer , Chuard ). The aim of this paper is to show that the situation is even more dire for nonconceptualists, for even if the re-identification condition remains in its original form, the argument from fineness of grain still fails to make the case for nonconceptualism. The paper's central case rests on two claims: according to the first, if the re-identification condition holds, then some beliefs will represent some properties nonconceptually; and according to the second, if some beliefs represent some properties nonconceptually, the argument from fineness of grain fails to make the case for nonconceptualism in any relevant sense. It follows that if the re-identification condition holds, the argument from fineness of grain fails to make the case for nonconceptualism. |
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Philosophical Papers "In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts"ABSTRACT In recent debates, both physicalist and anti-physicalist philosophers of mind have come to agree that understanding the nature of phenomenal concepts is key to understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness itself. Recently, however, Derek Ball (2009) and Michael Tye (2009) have argued that there are no such concepts. Their case is especially troubling because they make use of a type of argument that proponents of phenomenal concepts have typically found persuasive in other contexts; namely, arguments much like those that Tyler Burge used to motivate a certain form of externalism about mental content. The goal of this paper is to defend phenomenal concepts against this line of attack. Burge-style arguments, I contend, cannot be successfully used to make the case that there are no phenomenal concepts. As such, phenomenal concepts must remain central to understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness. |
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Journal of Consciousness Studies "The Phenomenal Concept Strategy" Co-Authored with Peter CarruthersABSTRACT A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain the facts that the anti-physicalist claims can only be explained by a non-reductive account of phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers (2006) argues that the phenomenal concept strategy is doomed to fail. This article presents the phenomenal concept strategy, Chalmers' argument against it, and a defence of the strategy against his argument. |
Books by Dr. Charles E. M.
Dunlop, David M. French Professor Emeritus and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy
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Glossary of Cognitive Science The Paragon House Glossary Series is designed to address the urgent needs of students and professors in subject areas that are evolving so rapidly that it has become difficult to keep up with new discoveries, methodologies, and critiques. This compendium of 433 entries, ranging from 25 to 250 words in length, offers a thorough guide to the specialized terms used in one of the most exciting and fastest growing areas of intellectual inquiry. |
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Philosophical Essays on Dreaming The study of dreaming has excited philosophers for centuries, and the past few decades have significantly advanced our understanding of the subject. This book is a collection of the most important philosophical articles on dreaming that have appeared in the past thirty years. Included are papers by such well-known figures as A.J. Ayer, Norman Malcom, and David F. Pears.The sixteen essays address the topics of dreaming and skepticism, the relationship of dreams to perceptions, the concept of dreaming, and the relevance of contemporary dream research to philosophy. In the course of their discussion, the contributors bring out important connections between philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and theories of meaning. Thus, besides confronting a subject of considerable intrinsic interest, this book provides a case study of a meeting point between philosophy and psychology, and several branches of philosophy. Professor Dunlop contributes a substantial introduction tracing many of these connections and relating the articles to each other in a systematic and coherent fashion. He also includes a critical appraisal of many of the arguments, and furnishes background material, particularly on the philosophical views of Norman Malcom and on the recent discoveries in sleep laboratories. |
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Computerization and Controversy, First Edition How computers will change the world, both technologically and socially, has been the subject of many debates. This collection of essays doesn't try to predict the changes; instead, it clarifies the areas of controversy and brings up a range of possible futures rather than one predicted future. |
Book Chapters by Dr.
Charles E. M. Dunlop, David M. French Professor Emeritus and Professor Emeritus
of Philosophy
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Encyclopedia of Computer Science, 4th Edition Edited by Anthony Ralston, Edwin D. Reilly, and David HemmendingerChapter Title: "Computer Ethics" ABSTRACT Computer ethics is the study of moral concepts, principles, and reasoning, applied in contexts that involve computers in some essential way. The stipulation "essential" rules out situations that raise the same ethical issues that would be raised if a computer were not involved. Morally, for example, the theft or wanton destruction of a computer is on a par with stealing or destroying a bicycle or a piano. In other circumstances, as will be discussed, computers do create distinct moral quandaries. |
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Epistemology and Cognition Edited by J.H. FetzerChapter Title: "Conceptual Dependency as the Language of Thought" ABSTRACT Roger Schank's research in AI takes seriously the ideas that understanding natural language involves mapping its expressions into an internal representation scheme and that these internal representations have a syntax appropriate for computational operations. It therefore falls within the computational approach to the study of mind. This paper discusses certain aspects of Schank's approach in order to assess its potential adequacy as a (partial) model of cognition. This version of the Language of Thought hypothesis encounters some of the same difficulties that arise for Fodor's account. |
Journal Articles by Dr.
Charles E. M. Dunlop, David M. French Professor Emeritus and Professor Emeritus
of Philosophy
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Philosophical Psychology "Mentalese Semantics and the Naturalized Mind"ABSTRACT In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, that the ontological commitments of intentional psychology survive within a broader conception of naturalism than the one adopted by Fodor. |
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Philosophical Psychology "Searle's Unconcious Mind"ABSTRACT In his bookThe rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a role in psychological explanation. |
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The Information Society "Controversies about Computerization and the Character of White Collar Worklife"ABSTRACT The way that computerization changes white collar work is the subject of significant controversies in the research and professional communities. This paper examines some of the key controversies about the way that computerization influences patterns of coordination control in workplaces, including monitoring. It examines debates about upskilling and deskilling, and the role of organizational infrastructure in making computerized systems more usable. It also examines the ways that computerization might foster new forms of work organization. |
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Synthese "Conceptual Dependency as the Language of Thought"ABSTRACT Roger Schank's research in AI takes seriously the ideas that understanding natural language involves mapping its expressions into an internal representation scheme and that these internal representations have a syntax appropriate for computational operations. It therefore falls within the computational approach to the study of mind. This paper discusses certain aspects of Schank's approach in order to assess its potential adequacy as a (partial) model of cognition. This version of the Language of Thought hypothesis encounters some of the same difficulties that arise for Fodor's account. |
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Synthese "Wittgenstein on Sensation and 'Seeing-As'"ABSTRACT Although Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind has given rise to a vast body of critical literature, his discussion of sensation has so far received only piecemeal treatment. In fact, the focus of commentators has been so much on the private-language argument that it may appear as if Wittgenstein had little else to say relevant to the topic of sensation. Although I shall of course pay heed to that argument, my main concern is to sketch an overview of Wittgenstein's approach to sensation. One special virtue I should like to claim for it is that it provides some important thematic continuity between the two parts of thePhilosophical Investigations. Another feature is that it avoids imputing to Wittgenstein various traditional philosophical doctrines which some of his critics, as well as some of his followers, claim to find in the later writings. |
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The Southern Journal of Philosophy "Kim's Supervenient Mind"ABSTRACT The point of departure for much work in the philosophy of mind is the acknowledgment that mental events exist and interact with bodily events. The problem has been to explain how this is possible. A very natural approach to the issue at some point invokes psychological correlation laws, which specify a nomological connection between mental events and their neural correlates. Even dualists may grant this much, in an effort to show how dualist-interactionism comports with a Humean view of causation. And identity theories have typically taken psychological correlation laws to be an important part of their reductionist program. Thus, from a variety of viewpoints, psycho-physical correlation laws appear as essential ingredients in an account of psychophysical causation. Jaegwon Kim, however, has recently argued that “Far from resolving the problem of psychophysical causation, the existence of psychophysical correlation laws can be seen to generate the problem of psychophysical causation in a new form”. I want first to outline the “new form” of the problem as Kim sees it, and then to discuss his proposed solution. |
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy "Belief in Dreams"ABSTRACT The view of dreaming that has come to be called 'Cartesian' maintains that dreams consist of experiences occurring in sleep. Since these (usually) nocturnal experiences are said often to resemble waking perceptions, and at least sometimes to include (false) beliefs, it appears that the Cartesian account of dreaming can easily generate a sceptical argument concerning the external world. Such a position was recently endorsed by E. M. Curley, who drew on the findings of contemporary dream research in support of it. E Don Mannison, however, has since argued that Curley's conclusions are based on an unjustified assumption? I believe Mannison to be mistaken, and my aim irr what follows is to show why. |
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Philosophia "Dreams, Skepticism, and Scientific Research"ABSTRACT The topic of dreaming has received a good deal of attention in recent years, owing in large measure to a provocative paper by Margaret Macdonald and two publications by Norman Malcolm. Both Macdonald and Malcolm argue, from rather different directions, against the historically well-entrenched idea that dream states are sufficiently like waking states that we may mistake one for the other. Their strategy is to try to undermine Cartesian skepticism by arguing that there are radical conceptual disparities between dreaming and waking. If the 'anti-traditionalist' account of Macdonald and Malcolm could be established as correct, it would appear to follow that dream skepticism has no foothold. I shall argue, however, that purely conceptual considerations do not clearly favor the Macdonald-Malcolm theory, and that future experimental studies may refute it. |
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy "Lehrer and Ellis on Incorrigibility"ABSTRACT The issue of incorrigibility has long been of central importance to both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Although the number of incorrigibilists seems to have dwindled in recent years, a useful paper by Frank Jackson has sought to show that the incorrigibility thesis has not been refuted. My aim is to strengthen that conclusion by considering (and rejecting) two further arguments against the incorrigibility doctrine. |
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The New Scholasticism "Anamnesis in thePhaedo"ABSTRACT My intention in this article is to examine Plato's doctrine of Recollection as it appears in thePhaedo. It is true, of course, that the theory occurs in other dialogues-explicitly in theMeno andPhaedrus, and implicitly, as some commentators would have it, in theSymposium, Republic, Theaetetus, Timaeus andSeventh Epistle. My attention here, however, will be restricted to themes which can be addressed without much consideration of dialogues other than thePhaedo. I shall begin by reviewing Plato's presentation of the Recollection doctrine since, despite the familiarity of its general outlines, a purview of some details will be useful for the critical points I shall later develop. Part II will be addressed to an accusation which a recent commentator has leveled against Plato--namely, that thePhaedo embodies two mutually incompatible attitudes toward sense-perception. My concern in Part II will be to exonerate Plato of this charge. |
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Philosophical Studies "Performatives and Dream Skepticism"ABSTRACT An important contention in Norman Malcolm's monograph,Dreaming, was that skepticism about one's present state (Am I awake or dreaming?) is untenable. Malcolm's book has been thoroughly and effectively criticized from a number of vantage points, but implicit in it is one argument against skepticism which these criticisms leave unscathed. I wish to call attention to this facet of Malcolm's doctrine, and to argue against it. |
Books by Dr. Nathan Oaklander,
David M. French Professor Emeritus and Professor Emeritus
of Philosophy
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Presentism: Essential Readings There is no time like the present. Is it also true that there is no time but the present? According to presentism, the present time is special in the most fundamental sense because all of reality is included in it. What is past is no longer; what is future is yet to be. This philosophy of time, with roots as far back as Saint Augustine and beyond, is the focus of vigorous and widespread discussion in contemporary philosophy. Presentism: Essential Readings brings together for the first time the seminal works by both presentists and their opponents. Works by Augustine, McTaggart, Prior, Craig and others, address a wide array of issues concerning presentism. How can time pass if everything is present? Is there no future to come to the present; nor a past to receive the present? How can there be truths about the past? Generally a statement is true because of events in reality. But if presentism is correct, then the past would seem to lack a basis in reality. If only the present is real, how can things last? To persist seems to require that something exist at more than one time, but presentism holds that there is only one time: the present. The collected essays on presentism address these and other aspects of the debate - a debate that is just beginning. With explanatory introductions written by the editors, Presentism: Essential Essays will fascinate and stretch the minds of both scholars and novices alike. |
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Tempo E Identità Translated by Giovanni Iorio GiannoliTutto persiste e sembra conservare la propria identità attraverso il tempo, malgrado ogni cambiamento. L'analisi di Oaklander parte da interrogativi che attraversano l'intera storia della filosofia e che vengono riformulati nei termini della filosofia analitica contemporanea. Pur ammettendo che la metafisica non è in grado dì fornire risposte definitive a problemi di questo genere, Oaklander si impegna a fornire argomenti che non siano in contrasto con ciò che la scienza ci dice rispetto alla natura delle cose e al ruolo del tempo. |
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The Philosophy of Time What is the nature of temporal passage—the movement of events or moments of time from the future through the present into the past? Is the future and the past as real as the present, or is the present—or perhaps the present and the past—all that exists? What role, if any, does language play in giving us an insight into temporal reality? Is it possible to travel through time into distant regions of the future or the past? What accounts for the direction of time, the sense we have that we are moving toward the future and not back into the past? What is the relation between the physics of time and the philosophy of time?These are the kind of dizzying questions that have been addressed by metaphysicians since antiquity, and time has remained a critical concept for many thinkers and philosophers since then (for instance, in his Confessions, St Augustine, restating an observation by Plotinus, wrote: 'So what is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I seek to explain it, I do not'). Interest in the subject has also been enduring—and has blossomed anew in the past century. The Philosophy of Time is a new title in the Routledge series, Critical Concepts in Philosophy. It meets the need for an authoritative reference work to make sense of the subject's vast literature and the continuing explosion in research output. Edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, a leading scholar in the philosophy of time, this new Major Work from Routledge brings together in four volumes the canonical and the very best cutting-edge scholarship in the field to provide a synoptic view of all the key issues and current debates. With a comprehensive introduction to the collection, newly written by the editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, The Philosophy of Time is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by philosophers of time—as well as those working in related areas of philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of religion—as a vital research resource. |
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C.D. Broad's Ontology of Mind C. D. Broad's writing on various philosophical issues spans more than half a century. Rather than attempt to trace the development of his thought throughout these fifty years this book considers his most representative work, namely, "The Mind and Its Place in Nature". Nor does the scope of this study encompass the whole of that book, but only some of the issues he discusses in it. Specifically, Oaklander considers what Broad has to say about such fundamental issues as substance, universals, relations, space, time, and intentionality in the contexts of perception, memory and introspection. |
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Metaphysics: Classic and Contemporary Readings One of the most acclaimed introductions to Metaphysics in recent history, Hoy and Oaklander'sMETAPHYSICS: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS--now, by popular demand, in a second edition--continues to provide teachers and students with a balanced approach of both classic and contemporary voices. Using time as a unifying theme and constantly examining the interplay between scientific development and philosophical thinking,METAPHYSICS presents readings that have been especially chosen for their accessibility to undergraduates and provides them with exceptionally deep coverage of a crucial set of metaphysical topics. |
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The Ontology of Time L Nathan Oaklander is internationally recognised as a leading defender of the tenseless theory of time. The thirty-one essays by Oaklander in this very useful collection have helped shape recent discussions of temporal becoming, and are frequently cited in the literature on the philosophy of time. Philosophers who hold that there is temporal becoming - meaning that events are first future, then become present, and finally become past - are proponents of the "tensed" theory of time. By contrast, philosophers who claim that all successively ordered events have the same ontological status - meaning that events do not 'come into being' as such but merely exist 'without becoming' at their respective temporal locations - are proponents of the 'tenseless' theory of time. Oaklander's lucid exposition of the critical issues involved in the study of time make this book essential for students, scholars, and anyone interested in this complex area of philosophy. |
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The Importance of Time The Importance of Time is a unique work that reveals the central role of the philosophy of time in major areas of philosophy. The first part of the book consists of symposia on two of the most important works in the philosophy of time over the past decade: Michael Tooley's Time, Tense, and Causation and D.H. Mellor's Real Time II. What characterizes these essays, and those that follow, are the interchanges between original papers, with original responses to them by commentators. The wide range of interrelated topics covered in this book is one of its most distinctive features. The book is divided into six parts: I. Book Symposia, II. Temporal Becoming, III. The Phenomenology of Time, IV. God, Time and Foreknowledge, V. Time and Physical Objects, and VI. Time and Causation, and contains 24 essays by leading philosophers in the various areas: Laurie Paul, Quentin Smith, L. Nathan Oaklander, Hugh Mellor, John Perry, William Lane Craig, Brian Leftow, Ned Markosian, Ronald C. Hoy, Michael Tooley, Storrs McCall, David Hunt, Mark Hinchliff, Robin Le Poidevin, Iain Martel and Eric M. Rubenstein. |
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Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics This is the first introduction to metaphysics which is tied together by the idea of time. Time, Change and Freedom explores ideas such as whether there was a beginning of time and the possibility of an infinite past and an eternal future. It looks at what happens when things change, and what affect that has on us and our personal identity. The book also asks if we can be free and what is the relationship of human freedom to various theories of divine foreknowledge and determinism? The final part of the book brings students right up to date with theories of relativity and contemporary cosmology about time and the universe. Sections in Time, Change and Freedom cover: The Problem of Change God, Time and Freedom Relational and Substantival Theories of Time Tenseless Time Written in an engaging dialogue form, this book will explain the key themes of contemporary metaphysics, and at the same time the philosophy of time, to the beginner. It will be invaluable for all students on introductory philosophy courses, and for students interested in the philosophy of time and metaphysics. |
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The New Theory of Time This book offers the latest turns in the debate over the new theory of time, with essays written by many of the most prominent contemporary thinkers in the philosophy of time. The Preface and the General Introduction to the book set the debate within the wider philosophical context and show why the subject of temporal becoming is a perennial concern of science, religion, language, logic, and the philosophy of mind. |
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Existentialist Philosophy: An Introduction (2nd Edition) Introducing readers to existentialist philosophy through the writings of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, De Beauvoir and others, this unique anthology includes long selections from a relatively small number of existentialist thinkers — exploring each philosopher's views in great detail, and prefacing the essays with insightful introductions to help clarify material. Offers creative, explicative chapter introductions to help readers grasp material to be covered. Provides in-depth essays from select existentialist figures to allow a fuller view of each philosopher considered. Illustrates existentialist philosophy in literature with Jean-Paul Sartre's No Exit, Albert Camus' The Stranger, and Heidegger's Being and Time. Includes practical end-of-chapter glossaries to help readers with technical terms and unfamiliar jargon. Now presents thought-provoking study/discussion questions, as well as an updated bibliography. For those interested in existentialism, late 19th century thought, and the philosophy of religion. |
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Temporal Relations and Temporal Becoming There are two different ways in which we ordinarily think and talk about time. On the one hand, we think of events in the world's history as being temporally related. On the other hand, we think of events as passing from the future into the present, and from the present into the past. To think of events in the second way is to conceive of them as temporally becoming. Philosophers have wondered which, if either, of these two ways of conceiving time is more fundamental. Although most of the recent books in the philosophy of time have been attempts to defend the becoming view, the aim of this work is to present systematic defense of Russellian theory of time according to which time consists solely of temporal relations between and among temporal objects. For courses in metaphysics, philosophy of time, and philosophical analysis. |
Book Chapters by
Dr. Nathan Oaklander, David M. French Professor Emeritus and Professor Emeritus
of Philosophy
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States of Affairs Edited by Maria ReicherChapter Title: "Time and Existence: A Critique of Degree Presentism" |
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Fostering the Ontological Turn: Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987) Edited by Rosaria EgidiChapter Title: "Is There a Difference Between Absolute and Relative Space" |
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Ontology and Analysis: Essays and Recollections about Gustav Bergmann Edited by Laird Addis, Greg Jesson, and Erwin TegtmeierChapter Title: "Reminiscences of Bergmann's Last Student" |
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Time and History: Proceeding of the 28 International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria 2005 Edited by Friedrich Stadler, Michael Stöltzner (Editor)Chapter Title: "Wishing It Were Now Some Other Time" |
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Questions of Time and Tense Edited by Robin Le PoidevinChapter Title: "Freedom and the New Theory of Time" |
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Time, Tense, and Reference Edited by Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin SmithChapter Title: "Two Versions of the New Theory of B-Language" |
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Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection Edited by H. L. DykeChapter Title: "Personal Identity, Responsibility, and Time" |
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Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor Edited by H. Lillehammer & G. Rodriguez PereyraChapter Title: "Presentism: A Critique" |
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Time, Reality and Experience Edited by Craig CallenderChapter Title: "Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience" |
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Nietzsche (The International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy) Edited by Richard WhiteChapter Title: "Nietzsche on Freedom" |
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Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings Edited by Alan SobleChapter Title: "Sartre on Sex" |
Recent Journal
Articles by Dr. Nathan Oaklander, David M. French Professor Emeritus and Professor Emeritus
of Philosophy
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Philosophia "McTaggart's Paradox and Crisp's Presentism"ABSTRACT In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis of temporal becoming, temporal properties and temporal relations is inadequate. Finally, in Part III, I shall demonstrate that his presentist ontology of time is susceptible to the paradox he so assiduously sought to avoid. |
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research "Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to Craig"ABSTRACT Recently William Lane Craig (2000, 2001) has attempted to resuscitate an argument, originally given by George Schlesinger (1980), against the tenseless or B-theory of time, according to which the only intrinsically temporal entities are the temporal relations of earlier ? later than and simultaneity. According to Craig, the objective reality of temporal becoming—the passage of time or events in time, from the future to the present and into the past—is implied by ''the experience of wishing it were now some other time; for example, '[Wishing that] it were now 1968!''' (2001, p. 160). For, following Schlesinger, Craig maintains when I wish that it were now some other time, what I am wishing for or what my wish is about is that the temporal particular, the NOW, or the temporal property of presentness, or some other metaphysical substitute for the property of presentness, be at some moment in the temporal series other than the moment at which it is now located. Since, however, on the B-theory there is no moving NOW and there are no suitable tenseless surrogates with the same meaning as the wish, Craig concludes that B-theorists must maintain that anyone who has such a wish (including B-theorists themselves since such a wish is commonplace) is to that extent irrational. Since Craig believes that the wish is rational and that the rationality of the wish can only be explained by appealing to the objectivity of tense and temporal becoming he infers that the experience in question is a strong argument for the A-theory and against the B-theory. But is the wish rational? And can it be explained only if an A-theoretic ontology is true? The aim of my paper is to explore those questions and in so doing provide a B-theoretic response to Craig's argument. |
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Analysis "B-time: a reply to Tallant"ABSTRACT The aim of Jonathan Tallant's recent article 'What is B-time?' (2007) is to demonstrate that B-time – which holds that time consists solely of tenseless temporal relations – is something of which we have no understanding, and that, therefore, if mind-independent time is B-time, then time is unreal. Of course, implicit in his own position is that since time is plausibly real and we do understand what time is, the correct ontology of time is A-time or tensed time. How then does Tallant purport to substantiate the crucial claim that 'we have no understanding of what “B-time” is' (2007: 147)? |
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Philo "Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage"ABSTRACT In a recent paper, Steven Savitt attempts to demonstrate that there is an area of common ground between one classic proponent of temporal passage, C.D. Broad, and one classic opponent of passage, D.C. Williams. According to Savitt, Broad's notion of "absolute becoming" as the ordered occurrence of (simultaneity sets of) events, and Williams' notion of "literal passage," as the happening of events strung along the four-dimensional spacetime manifold, are indistinguishable. Savitt recognizes that some might think it preposterous to maintain that Broad and Williams agree regarding the nature of passage, but by a consideration of Broad's "Ostensible Temporality," and Williams' "The Myth of Passage," Savitt attempts to demonstrate that they do in fact hold the same, and indeed the correct, view of passage. I shall argue, however, that Broad's account of the transitory aspect of time is ontologically distinguishable from Williams' and that only by confusing Broad's A-theory with Williams' B-theory or Williams' B-theory with Broad's A-theory could Savitt have thought that there is an area of overlap between them. A demonstration of these points will have the benefit of enabling us to clarity the ontological character of the dispute, of which Broad was well-aware, between the A- and B-theories of time. |
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Philo "Jokic on the Tensed Existence of Nature"ABSTRACT In "The Tensed or Tensless Existence of Nature" Alexsander Jokic attempts to defend a new version A. N. Prior's "Thank Goodness It's Over" argument against my response to it. Jokic argues that we can give a non-circular account ofceasing to exist ~hat will vindicate the new reading, but I argue that his account to rescue Prior's argument against my criticism fails. |
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Metaphysica "McTaggart's Paradox Defended"ABSTRACT No argument has done as much to stimulate debate in the philosophy of time as McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time. On the one side are A-theorists who believe McTaggart's positive thesis that time involves the A-series and temporal passage, but deny his negative thesis that the A-series and temporal passage are contradictory.2 On the other side are B-theorists who believe that McTaggart's positive conception of time is mistaken, but that his negative thesis is true.3 At least part of the reason why McTaggart's paradox has failed to convince defenders of passage is because they fail to appreciate his positive thesis and thereby misunderstand the rationale behind his negative thesis. The purpose of this paper is to prove that point. I shall proceed by first explicating what I take McTaggart's positive and negative theses to be. I shall then show how and why one recent response to McTaggart's paradox, which is representative of many, is unsuccessful because it misunderstands it. And finally, I will explain how a subsidiary benefit of my account of McTaggart's paradox is that it can provide a clear criterion for distinguishing passage from non-passage views of time. |
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Philo "Personal Identity, Immortality, and the Soul"ABSTRACT The soul has played many different roles in philosophy and religion. Two of the primary functions of the soul are the bearer of personal identity and the foundation of immortality. In this paper l shall consider different interpretations of what the soul has been taken to be and argue that however we interpret the soul we cannot consistently maintain the soul is both what we are and what continues after our bodily death. |
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Journal of Philosophical Research "Is There a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A- and B-Time?"ABSTRACT Clifford Williams has recently argued that the dispute between A- and B-theories, or tensed and tenseless theories of time, is spurious because once the confusions between the two theories are cleared away there is no real metaphysical difference between them. The purpose of this paper is to dispute Williams's thesis. I argue that there are important metaphysical differences between the two theories and that, moreover, some of the claims that Williams makes in his article suggest that he is sympathetic with a B-theoretic ontology. |
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The Modern Schoolman "Loux on Particulars: Concrete or Bare"ABSTRACT In his recent book, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, Michael Loux presents an argument against bare particulars, and offers an alternative Aristotelian account that takes concrete particulars to be basic or underived entities.1 We shall attempt to show that his argument against bare particulars fails, although it is exactly the same argument that can be raised against his own theory of Aristotelian substances. First, however, we must turn to the question, "What are bare particulars and why are they introduced?" |